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Anticipatory Anxiety Disrupts Neural Valuation during
Risky Choice
X Jan B. Engelmann,1,2* Friederike Meyer,1* Ernst Fehr,1† and XChristian C. Ruff1†
1Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research (SNS-Lab), Department of Economics, University of Zurich, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland, and
2Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging, Radboud University, 6525 HP, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Incidental negative emotions unrelated to the current task, such as background anxiety, can strongly influence decisions. This is most
evident in psychiatric disorders associatedwith generalized emotional disturbances.However, the neuralmechanismsbywhich inciden-
tal emotions may affect choices remain poorly understood. Here we study the effects of incidental anxiety on human risky decision
making, focusing on both behavioral preferences and their underlying neural processes. Although observable choices remained stable
across affective contexts with high and low incidental anxiety, we found a clear change in neural valuation signals: during high incidental
anxiety, activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum showed amarked reduction in (1) neural coding of the expected
subjective value (ESV) of risky options, (2) prediction of observed choices, (3) functional coupling with other areas of the valuation
system, and (4) baseline activity. At the same time, activity in the anterior insula showed an increase in coding the negative ESV of risky
lotteries, and this neural activity predicted whether the risky lotteries would be rejected. This pattern of results suggests that incidental
anxiety can shift the focus of neural valuation from possible positive consequences to anticipated negative consequences of choice
options.Moreover, our findings showthat these changes inneural value coding canoccur in theabsenceof changes inovert behavior.This
suggest a possible pathway bywhich background anxietymay lead to the development of chronic reward desensitization and amaladap-
tive focus on negative cognitions, as prevalent in affective and anxiety disorders.
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Introduction
Behavior is strongly guided by integral emotions that provide
affective information about which behavioral options should be
pursued or avoided (Rick and Loewenstein, 2008). How such
goal-directed valuation of choice options is instantiated in the
human brain is increasingly understood (Rangel et al., 2008; Lee
et al., 2012; Levallois et al., 2012; Rushworth et al., 2012), and it is
commonly assumed that dysfunctions of these goal-directed neu-
ral valuation processesmay account for behavioral pathologies in
psychiatric diseases (Sharp et al., 2012). However, emotions can
also guide behaviormore indirectly, for instance, when incidental
background emotions (e.g., general or dispositional anxiety) in-
fluence decisions despite not being relevant for the task at hand.
Such effects of incidental emotions on decision making can be
strongly detrimental, as evident in psychiatric disorders such as
anxiety disorders (Maner et al., 2007; Giorgetta et al., 2012; Gre-
cucci et al., 2013), depression (Harle´ et al., 2010; Engelmann et
al., 2013), or mania (Minassian et al., 2004). Despite their obvi-
ous importance, not much is known about the neural mecha-
nisms by which incidental emotions such as anxiety can affect
behavioral choices (Knutson et al., 2008; Harle´ et al., 2012).
The lack of knowledge about neural mechanisms for interac-
tions of incidental emotions and choices appears somewhat sur-
prising, given the substantial overlap in the neural circuits
involved in decisionmaking and the processing of affective states.
For instance, most core structures of the putative valuation net-
work of the brain, encompassing the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPFC), ventral striatum (VS), insula, and amygdala
(Hsu et al., 2005; De Martino et al., 2006; Preuschoff et al., 2008;
Levy and Glimcher, 2012), are also substantially involved in pro-
cessing anxiety (Hartley and Phelps, 2012). It is therefore likely
that incidental affective and task-related signals computed in
these same areas may interact, thereby providing a neural sub-
strate for immediate influences of background emotions on neu-
ral valuation during choice. Moreover, persisting incidental
affective states may shape processing in these neural structures
via neural plasticity, thereby possibly leading to chronic influ-
ences on neural computations involved in value-based choice
(Paulus and Yu, 2012; Huys et al., 2013).
Received July 14, 2014; revised Dec. 19, 2014; accepted Jan. 6, 2015.
Author contributions: J.B.E., F.M., E.F., and C.C.R. designed research; J.B.E. and F.M. performed research; J.B.E.
and F.M. analyzed data; J.B.E., F.M., E.F., and C.C.R. wrote the paper.
This work was supported by grants from the Swiss National Science Foundation (CRSII3_141965 and
51NF40_144609) to C.C.R. and E.F. aswell as the Swiss National Science FoundationNational Center of Competence
in Research Affective Sciences. J.B.E. was supported by the Radboud Excellence Initiative, a joint initiative of Rad-
boud University and Radboud University Medical Center. We thank Tony Williams, Yosuke Morishima, and Thomas
Epper for helpful comments on the statistical analyses and the manuscript. All authors gratefully acknowledge
support from the Neuroscience Center Zurich (ZNZ).
*J.B.E. and F.M. shared first authorship.
†E.F. and C.C.R. shared last authorship.
The authors declare no competing financial interests.
Correspondence should be addressed to either Christian C. Ruff or Friederike Meyer, Laboratory for Social and
Neural Systems Research (SNS-Lab), Department of Economics, Blu¨mlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zu¨rich, Switzerland.
E-mail: christian.ruff@econ.uzh.ch or frimey@gmail.com.
DOI:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2880-14.2015
Copyright © 2015 the authors 0270-6474/15/353085-15$15.00/0
The Journal of Neuroscience, February 18, 2015 • 35(7):3085–3099 • 3085
Here, we investigate with behavioral, electrophysiological,
and neural data how experimentally induced anticipatory anxiety
impacts on risky decision making. We chose to induce anticipa-
tory anxiety with a threat-of-shock technique (Schmitz and Gril-
lon, 2012) that has been successfully used in previous studies
(Robinson et al., 2011). In this approach, anticipatory anxiety is
induced as a physiological and affective response to an ongoing
threat of painful stimulation that is temporally unpredictable and
incidental to the task (Robinson et al., 2013b). Using this para-
digm during fMRI and electrophysiological recording, we thus
manipulated our participants’ affective state while they com-
pleted a set of risky choices involving monetary gains and losses.
This allowed us to investigate on a trial-by-trial basis the effects of
anticipatory anxiety on individual decision making and underlying
neural activity. Importantly, due to our within-subject design, we
could adequately control for potentially confounding variables
known to influence risk attitude, such as sociodemographic, trait,
and genetic factors (Dreher et al., 2009; Capra et al., 2013).
We find that incidental anxiety can fundamentally change the
mechanisms of value coding during risky choice in the absence of
overt behavioral changes. During anticipatory anxiety, neural
coding of subjective value in VMPFC and VS was decreased, but
neural coding of negative subjective value in anterior insula was
increased, thereby suggesting a shift in value coding from pre-
dicted positive consequences toward a focus on possible negative
outcomes. This change in neural value coding was clearly linked
to observed behavior, as choices during safe trials could be pre-
dicted from BOLD signals in the VMPFC and VS (but not in the
insula), whereas choices under threat could be predicted from the
insula (but not from the VMPFC and VS).
Materials andMethods
Subjects
Forty-three right-handed male subjects [mean (SEM) age, 22.56 years
(1.42 years)] without a history of psychiatric or neurologic disorder par-
ticipated in the study. In total, 10 subjects had to be excluded from the
study due to technical and image acquisition problems (excessive head
movement, n  1; scanner crash, n  3; sequence problem, n  1) or
noncompliancewith the task (n 5; estimation of behavioralmodels did
not converge due to choice patterns that showed too little consistency,
which is a common observation (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009)). This left a
total of 33 subjects whowere included in all subsequent analyses.Written
informed consentwas obtained fromall subjects, and all procedureswere
approved by the ethics committee of the canton of Zurich, Switzerland.
Experimental timeline
Approximately 1 week before the experiment, participants were invited
to the laboratory for an “endowment” session inwhich theywere paid for
completing a psychological questionnaire battery chosen to assess a com-
prehensive range of personality characteristics. This battery comprised
the DOSPERT scale (Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale; Weber et al.,
2002) to assess domain-specific risk attitude, the BIS-11 (Barratt Impul-
siveness Scale-11; Patton et al., 1995) to assess impulsivity, the NEO-FFI
(NEO-Five Factor Inventory; Borkenau and Ostendorf, 1993) to mea-
sure personality characteristics, the STAI (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory;
Spielberger et al., 1983) to assess anxiety symptoms, and the BDI (Beck
Depression Inventory; Hautzinger et al., 1995) to measure depressive
symptom severity. The participation fee for this session was a credit
voucher for 50 Swiss francs (CHF; approximately $58 US at the time of
testing). Importantly, it was stressed to the subjects that the money
earned during the endowment sessionwould be their starting balance for
the economic games played out in the second session, to avoid excessive
risk taking in that session due to the well-documented house money
effect (Thaler and Johnson, 1990).
During the second session, fMRI and electrodermal activity were re-
corded during a risky decision-making task (see Decision-making task
section). The task was preceded by a short training session and an indi-
vidual stimulation thresholding procedure (see Emotion induction tech-
nique section). The whole session lasted a total of 120 min (including
subject preparation, scanning time, and postexperimental debriefing)
and was remunerated with an additional show-up fee of 50 CHF.
Experimental procedures and task
Emotion induction technique.Anticipatory anxiety was induced by giving
participants advance information about impending but temporally
unpredictable electric stimulation in two distinct contexts. In the threat-
ening context (“threat trials” triggering anticipatory anxiety), the stimu-
lationwas painful, whereas in thematched safe context (“safe trials”), the
stimulation was just noticeable but not painful. To this end, we admin-
istered electrical stimulation with two DS5 Isolated Bipolar Constant
Current Stimulators (Digitimer Ltd.) and custom-made fMRI-
compatible 5 mm ring electrodes. Two of these electrodes were posi-
tioned above the first and fourth dorsal interossei muscles of the left
dorsal hand, respectively, to provide two separate locations for strong
and weak stimulation intensities. This was implemented to avoid desen-
sitization or carryover effects between both contexts. The intensities used
for stimulation were individually calibrated before the scanning session
with a well-established procedure (Singer et al., 2004). For this purpose,
electrical pulses of different intensities were repeatedly administered in a
randomized order, and participants rated each pulse on a visual analog
scale ranging from0 (not painful at all/hardly perceptible) to 10 (unbear-
ably painful) in steps of 1 point. Stimulus intensities corresponding to an
individual rating of 1 and 8 were chosen for the weak versus strong
experimental treatments, respectively. To control for sensitization or
desensitization, subjects had to rerate both low- and high-stimulation
intensity after each fMRI run, and stimulus intensity was set for each run
to the rerated values of 1 and 8, respectively.
During each fMRI run, stimulation could occur at unpredictable time
points during decision-making periods, thus creating threat or safe peri-
ods during which participants were expecting strong versus weak electri-
cal stimulation, respectively. The two affective contexts were presented in
a blocked fashion. During each block, participants made four risky deci-
sions, as outlined in detail below. To augment the efficacy of anticipatory
anxiety induction, the number and time points of electrical stimulation
events throughout both threat and safe blocks were determined to be
completely unpredictable for subjects. For this purpose, the number of
stimulation events was determined for each block by random draw
from a gamma distribution (shape parameter, 1; scale parameter, 1).
The exact timing of these stimulation events was then determined at
random time points between the offset of the cue display and the
onset of the resting screen, as determined by drawing from a uniform
distribution with the constraint that successive electrical shocks were
separated by at least 0.2 s.
The emotion induction was conducted in a within-subject design.
Each subject made decisions in both affective contexts and therefore
could serve as his own control. This has significant advantages over a
between-subject design, where the effects of affective context could be
confounded by individual differences in variables that are known to in-
fluence risk attitude, such as sociodemographic, personality, and genetic
factors (Dreher et al., 2009; Capra et al., 2013). On the flip side, the
within-subject design chosen here comes with the small risk that partic-
ipantsmaymake their choices based onmemorywhen confrontedwith a
specific lottery for a second time, in a different affective context. This
conjecture appears highly unlikely, as subjects would need to remember
their choices for 280 trials that were presented in random order. We
nevertheless took care to inspect our data for such effects, by conducting
regression analyses to test whether reaction times were different for lot-
teries that were presented for the first or the second time (such differ-
ences would be expected if participants responded frommemory, which
requires less deliberation). No such effects were revealed by these analy-
ses (see Results), suggesting that participants used the same strategies to
evaluate the first and second presentation of each lottery.
All visual and tactile stimuli were presented and recorded with
Cogent 2000 (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) implemented
in MATLAB (MathWorks).
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Decision-making task. The fMRI experiment consisted of seven runs
(eachwith an average duration of 472 s), duringwhich participantsmade
risky decisions in the threat and safe contexts. Each of these runs (Fig. 1a,
timeline) comprised five threat blocks with strong stimulation intensity
and five safe blocks with weak stimulation intensity. These blocks lasted
43 s on average and were pseudorandomly interleaved so that not more
than two blocks of the same affective valence would follow each other.
The single experimental blocks were interleaved with resting blocks of 6 s
duration to allow sustained hemodynamic activity to return to baseline.
During each block, four decision-making trials were presented to the
participants. On each trial, participants had to choose between taking
part in a lottery with two equiprobable (50/50) options and a sure out-
come. In five of the seven functional runs, we used “mixed gambles,” in
which the lottery ledwith 50%probability to awin of amount x1 andwith
50% probability to a loss of amount x2. The sure outcome was always a
zero change in income (Fig. 1b, gamble composition). The relationship
between gain and loss amounts was chosen to encourage a reasonable
amount of risk taking. Previous research indicates that participants over-
weight losses relative to gains in amultiplicative fashion (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). We therefore used prospect theory to parameterize gen-
eral risk taking and this overweighting (see Behavioral data analysis sec-
tion) and to inform the analysis of neural valuation processes. All
neuroimaging analyses were performed based on the five mixed-gamble
runs.
To facilitate parameter estimation for the behavioral choice models,
we also included two additional functional runs composed of gain-only
and loss-only gambles. These “pure gamble” runs were presented in ran-
dom positions within the sequence of mixed-gamble runs and included
an equal number of gain-only trials (20 trials) and loss-only trials (20
trials) within each run. Pure gambles differed frommixed gambles in that
lottery outcomes were now either both positive (50% probability to win
amount x1 or x2) or both negative (50% probability to lose amount x1 or
x2). Lottery amounts in the gain-only domain varied between 0 and 30
(in steps of 10) for x1, and between 20 and 45 (in steps of 5) for x2.
Lotteries in the loss-only domain varied between 0 and 30 for x1 (in
steps of 10), and between 20 and 45 (in steps of 5) for x2. The sure
outcome was always a nonzero amount generated by calculating a cer-
tainty equivalent (CE) corresponding to different levels of risk aversion
for each pure lottery. To capture different degrees of risk aversion, five
Figure 1. Hybrid fMRI design. a, The top row illustrates the timing of different blocks and the bottom row the timing of the gambles. Blocks that were threatening (strong stimulation) or safe
(weak stimulation) were randomly interleaved (2 of 10 blocks per run are shown). The type of block was indicated by the screen color (blue or green), which was constant throughout the block. At
the beginning of each block, a cue (STRONG or WEAK) was displayed, followed by delivery of a “reminder shock” (dark or light red arrow, respectively, following the cue display). After a jittered
intertrial interval (ITI; empty screen), the beginning of a gamble was signaled by a fixation cross, followed by the gamble screen. Subjects were instructed to choose their preferred option (lottery
or sure outcome) as fast and accurately as possible via button press. Each block comprised four gambles and was followed by a REST period. Electrical stimulation was delivered randomly and
unpredictably during the whole block [indicated by the varying positions of dark red (strong stimulation) or light red (weak stimulation) arrows; the only stimulation-free phases were the rest
periods]. b, Possible gains and losses for mixed gambles. Gain and loss values were sampled from the gain–loss matrix depicted on the left (columns, gains; rows, losses). Each of the resulting
combinations was shown once in the safe and once in the threat condition. For this purpose, the lottery with the corresponding outcomes was shown on one side of the screen, whereas the
corresponding safe outcomewas shown on the other side (see right panel for the example screen). The presentation sides for lottery option and sure option outcomeswere counterbalanced across
participants.
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different degrees of risk aversion were assumed for both the gain domain
and the loss domain; each of these parameter values was used for the
calculation of the certainty equivalent for four different lotteries in both
the threat and safe context. The CE was calculated as follows:
CEGain 0.5 x1
  0.5 x2
1/ (1)
CELoss 0.5 x1
  0.5 x2
1/, (2)
where and capture the degree of risk aversion in the gain domain and
loss domain of the value function, respectively. The following values of 
and  were used to create CEs:     [0.2, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.3] (see
detailed description in the Behavioral data analysis section).
Payment schedule. Seven choices were randomly drawn and played out
after the experiment (one per functional run). Their mean outcome
(which could be negative or positive) was added to the 100CHF show-up
fee for both sessions to determine the participants’ final payoff.
fMRI data acquisition. Functional magnetic resonance images were
collected using a 3 T Achieva whole-body magnetic resonance scanner
(Philips Medical Systems) equipped with an eight-channel sensitivity-
encoded (SENSE) head coil (Philips Medical Systems). Structural image
acquisition consisted of 180 T1-weighted transversal images (0.75 mm
slice thickness). For functional imaging, T2* images were obtained using
a SENSET2*-weighted echoplanar imaging sequence (Pruessmann et al.,
1999) with an acceleration factor of 2.0. The sequence consisted of 33
axial slices covering thewhole brain (slice thickness, 3mm; interslice gap,
0.75 mm; ascending sequential acquisition; flip angle, 78°; repetition
time, 1750ms; echo time, 30ms; field of view, 240mm;matrix size, 80
80). To optimize functional sensitivity in orbitofrontal cortex and the
medial temporal lobes, we used a tilted acquisition in an oblique orien-
tation at 20° relative to the anterior commissure–posterior commis-
sure line (Deichmann et al., 2003).
Psychophysiological measures. To confirm the efficacy of the threat-of-
shock treatment, we acquired skin conductance responses (SCRs) using a
PowerLab 4/25T amplifier with a GSR Amp (ML116) unit and a pair of
MR-compatible finger electrodes (MLT117F). The electrodes were at-
tached to the participant’s left index and ring fingers using conducting gel
and dedicated Velcro. Recordings were performed with Lab Chart 5 soft-
ware, with the recording range set to 40 S and using initial baseline
correction (“subject zeroing”) to subtract the participant’s absolute level
of electrodermal activity from all recordings (devices and software from
ADInstruments). Each participant’s SCRs were initially smoothed with a
running average over 500 samples (0.5 s) to reduce scanner-induced
noise. Data were then resampled from 1 kHz to 1 Hz and subsequently
z-transformed. In line with previously established methods (Bach et al.,
2009; Choi et al., 2012), we estimated mean SCRs during the decision
periods of both affective conditions with multiple linear regression anal-
ysis, as implemented in Analysis of Functional NeuroImages (or AFNI)
software (Cox, 1996). The statistical model contained a total of six re-
gressors that reflected the onset times of choices under expectancy of
strong and weak electrical shocks, cue times indicating the onset of a
block, and delivery times of strong and weak electrical shocks. Average
responses to each trial type were estimated via deconvolution from event
onset to 16 s after onset using 17 cubic spline basis functions. Baseline
drifts of the SCR were modeled with constant linear and quadratic terms
included for each run. For these analyses, SCR datasets of two subjects
had to be excluded due to acquisition problems.
Behavioral data analysis. Behavioral data were analyzed using R (www.
r-project.org) and Stata (StataCorp). As a first step, reaction times (RTs)
and gambling rates (percentage of trials where lotteries were chosen) were
compared between the threat and safe contexts.Moreover, we inspected the
data for adaptation and order effects by means of a regression model (with
robust SEs clustered by subject). This model regressed trial-wise reaction
timesonvariables representing thepresentationorderof each choice (first vs
second presentation in the experiment), affective context (threat vs safe),
gain and loss amount, the experimental trial (1–280, to account for learning
effects), and all two-way interactions of these variables.
In a second step, Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT; Bruhin et al.,
2010) was used to derive subject-specific prospective utilities U(x) of
each lottery x with outcomes x1 and x2. The lottery in each trial was
formalized as follows:
x   x1, p1; x2, p2, (3)
where pi is the probability of obtaining outcome xi, i  {1, 2}, and p1 p2
1. To calculate subject-specific values of the lottery, we fitted the value
function of prospect theory to determine the value v(xi) for each out-
come xi, as follows:
v xi   xi if xi  0	xi if xi  0 (4)
where  quantifies risk aversion in the win domain,  quantifies risk
aversion in the loss domain, and 	 quantifies the overweighting of losses
relative to gains. We allowed risk preferences to vary between the threat
and safe conditions by defining the following:
  1
 T S  T T, (5)
  1
 T S  T T, (6)
and
	  1
 T 	S  T 	T, (7)
where
T   1 if threat trial0 if safe trial (8)
and subscript S denotes parameters for safe trials, whereas subscript T
denotes parameters during threat trials. The prospective utility of a gam-
ble, U(x), is defined as follows:
U x  	 p1  v x1
  	 p2  v x2
, (9)
where we ignore the nonlinear probability weighting typically present in
prospect theory models because we restricted p1 p2 0.5.
To determine the probability p of choosing the lottery option (LO)
over the sure option (SO), we used a formof the logit probabilistic choice
rule that allows for noise in option selection via the free parameter , as
follows:
pLO, SO 1/	1 eU(LO)U(SO)))]. (10)
fMRI data analysis. Preprocessing and statistical analyses of functional
data were performed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, London, UK). All functional volumes were realigned to
the first volume using b-spline interpolation and were unwarped using
fieldmaps estimated by SPM to remove residual movement-related vari-
ance due to susceptibility-by-movement interactions (Andersson et al.,
2001). To improve coregistration, bias-corrected and coregistered ana-
tomical and mean echoplanar images were created using the New Seg-
ment toolbox in SPM. The forward deformation fields created in the
context of the nonlinear normalization of individual gray matter tissue
probability maps were then used to normalize the functional time series
to theMontreal Neurological Institute (MNI) T1 template. Finally, func-
tional data underwent spatial smoothing using an isotropic 6 mm
FWHMGaussian kernel.
Statistical analyses were performed using the general linear model
(GLM; Friston et al., 1994). Regressors of interest were modeled using
canonical hemodynamic response functions (HRFs) temporally aligned
with the onset of the events of interest. Time and dispersion derivatives
were added to account for subject-to-subject and voxel-to-voxel varia-
tion in response peak and dispersion (Henson et al., 2002). Neural pro-
cesses triggered by lottery presentation per se (averaging over all different
lotteries)weremodeledwith two regressors (trials in safe context, trials in
threat context). Neural valuation processes on each trial were modeled
with two parametric regressors (one for threat trials and one for safe
trials) that coded the neural expected subjective value (ESV) of each
lottery (Levy et al., 2010), as was also done in other studies of mixed
gambles (Minati et al., 2012a,b; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013). ESV was
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defined for each gamble as the neural representation of the behaviorally
measuredU(x) (see Behavioral data analysis section) andwas assumed to
linearly correlate with U(x) (Levy et al., 2010). As the SO was 0 for all
mixed-gamble trials, it was omitted from the GLM. The value regressors
in the GLM spanned for each trial the decision period from the onset of
the decision screen until the subject’s choice, as indicated by button
press. Estimation of the behavioral model revealed that the loss aversion
coefficients 	T and 	Swere not significantly different from each other. In
a similar vein, no significant deviations from 1 were found for the risk
aversion parametersS,T,S, andT. We therefore used the individual
mean loss aversion coefficient 	 (	T 	S)/2 as subject-specific input
to derive the predicted neural valuation processes for each trial. Note,
however, that inclusion of the estimated loss aversion coefficients in the
T and S conditions, 	T and 	S, instead of the average of the two conditions,
did not lead to significantly different fMRI results. Additional regressors
added to the first-levelGLMcorresponded to the cues at thebeginningof the
blocks, actual electrical stimulation at weak and strong intensities, and trials
where participants omitted responses. The main effects and interactions of
affective context and decision making were computed with linear contrasts
of the first-level parameter estimates, resulting in one contrast estimate for
each of these effects in each participant.
Statistical inference was performed with second-level random-effects
comparisons of the first-level contrasts representing the trial onset and
ESV regressors for the threat and safe context. We tested our hypotheses
about changes in neural valuation due to anticipatory anxiety in regions
of interest (ROIs) previously shown to be involved in neural valuation
and emotion processing. These regions comprised theVMPFC (Levy and
Glimcher, 2011;Winecoff et al., 2013), VS (Tom et al., 2007; Bartra et al.,
2013; Robinson et al., 2013a), insula (Robinson et al., 2013a), and
amygdala (Jenison et al., 2011; Fossati, 2012). Bilateral masks for
amygdala and insula were taken from the WFU PickAtlas (http://fmri.
wfubmc.edu/software/PickAtlas). For VMPFC and VS, which are ana-
tomically less distinctively defined, we usedMNI coordinates and extent
estimations from the published literature. MNI coordinates for the
VMPFC mask (right VMPFC: x  4.27, y  35.18, z  11.82; left
VMPFC: x  7.29, y  38, z  10.57; spheres with 12 mm radius)
were taken from ameta-analysis of neural valuation processes (Levy and
Glimcher, 2012). Bilateral MNI coordinates for the VS [bilateral inferior
vs (nucleus accumbens): x9, y 9, z8; superior ventral stria-
tum (ventral caudate): x10, y 15, z 0; spheres with 6mmradius]
were taken from a study using connectivity-based parcellation of the
striatum (Di Martino et al., 2008), which has also been used for this
purpose by other studies (Kelly et al., 2009). These eight regions were
combined into a simple ROI mask using the WFU PickAtlas “Union”
function. All analyses of value-related responses were restricted to this
inclusivemaskwith the statistical threshold set at p 0.001, uncorrected,
which is in line with the threshold commonly used in a priori defined
hypothesis tests of value-related responses in these regions (Plassmann et
al., 2010; Kang et al., 2011; Litt et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2012; Sokol-Hessner
et al., 2012). Additionally, we ran exploratory whole-brain analyses with
a statistical threshold of p  0.05, which was familywise error (FWE)
corrected for the full brain.
Trial-by-trial regression analysis of the relationship between ROI signal
and subjective value. To confirm the results of the SPM analyses with
independent data, we examined the link between subjective values and
neural activity in analyses of the trial-by-trial time course data extracted
from the VMPFC, VS, and insula. We used the leave-one-subject-out
(LOSO) cross-validation procedure (Esterman et al., 2010), in which
regions for the extraction of each subject’s data are defined by a GLM
analysis of value responses in the other N  1 subjects. This procedure
ensures that ROI analyses are performed on new data that are indepen-
dent of those used for ROI definition, thereby avoiding circular inference
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2009) and allowing within-sample replication in an
independent dataset.
Specifically, activation time courses were extracted from spherical vol-
umes of interest (VOIs) centered on the activation foci from each LOSO
GLM within the VMPFC (12 mm radius), VS (6 mm radius), and insula
(12 mm radius). Data were spatially averaged over the sphere and were
temporally downsampled to one value for each trial, by averaging over 4
images within the period of 3.5–10.5 s after trial onset. This ensured that
the data summarized the delayed and dispersed hemodynamic response
reflecting choice-relevant computations (RTs ranged from 0.48 to 6.16 s
after stimulus onset). Spatial and temporal averaging and correction for
session and movement confounds were implemented using the VOI
toolbox in SPM8.
As a first step, we examined whether trial-by-trial activity within our
regions of interest encodes subjective value differentially during the pres-
ence of threat relative to no threat. To this end, we regressed trial-by-trial
signal changes in our ROIs on subjective value and threat, and their
interaction, using the following model:
Signalti 1  SVti 2  Tti 3  SVti  Tti 4  Xti
 TRti e, (11)
where for each subject i on trial t, Signal is the regional signal within a
given ROI, SV reflects the subjective value, T is a dummy variable that
encodes the presence of threat, X reflects a vector of subject-specific
confounding variables that include age, trait anxiety and the emotional
stability subscale of the NEO-FFI, and TRti denotes trial number to con-
trol for temporal variation in the signal.
Prediction of choices from activation time courses in VOIs. To demon-
strate the link between brain activity in each region of interest and the
overt economic choices, we performed prediction analyses of choices
based on neural signals (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Berns et al., 2008).
These analyses were conducted to investigate whether neural signals from
independently defined regions in VMPFC, VS, and insula predict overt
choice, and how this predictive relationship changes with affective context
(threat vs safe). To this end, we conducted logistic regression of mixed-
gamble acceptanceonneural signals (extracted fromsubject-specific regions
using the identical LOSO approach as described above), affective context
(threat, safe), and their interaction using the followingmodel:
Choiceti 1  Signalti 2  Tti 3  Signalti  T 4  Xti
 TRti e, (12)
where for each subject ion trial t,Choice is adummyvariable that reflects the
acceptanceofmixedgambles, Signal is the regional signalwithinagivenROI,
T is a dummy variable that codes the presence of threat,X reflects a vector of
subject-specific confounding variables that include age, trait anxiety and the
emotional stability subscale of the NEO-FFI, and TRti denotes trial number
to control for temporal variation in the signal.
For both regression models, we first conducted analyses of all trials to
test how affective context interacts with subjective values (Eq. 11; ordi-
nary least squares) or regional BOLD signals (Eq. 12; Logit). To further
characterize these interactions, we then conducted follow-up analyses of
only threat trials and only safe trials, using a simpler model that did not
include the affective-context factor and its interaction. The parameters of
all regression models were estimated using robust and clustered SEs that
correct for heteroscedasticity and correlated responses from each subject
using the Huber–White method implemented in the robcov function of
the RegressionModeling Strategies (RMS) package in R. Statistical infer-
ence on the estimated parameters was performed at a one-tailed p 0.05,
given the clear hypotheses in these confirmatory analyses.
Psychophysiological interaction analysis. To test whether the induction
of anticipatory anxiety caused changes in the functional connectivity
within the valuation network (VMPFC, VS, insula, and amygdala) and
with regions outside this network, we conducted psychophysiological
interaction (PPI) analyses using a generalized formof context-dependent
PPI analysis (McLaren et al., 2012). PPI regressors were added to the
same statisticalmodel as described above (but omitting parametricmod-
ulators). Seed regions for PPI analysis were defined as spheres with a 3
mm radius centered on peak voxels of activation found in the ESV-
related contrasts of the GLM analysis. To obtain an estimate of neural
activity within the seed region, the first temporal eigenvariate of a prin-
ciple component analysis of the BOLD signal in all voxels of the seed
region was extracted and deconvolved (Gitelman et al., 2003). A new
GLM was then estimated for each subject that included the original de-
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sign matrix and the following additional regressors: the deconvolved
time course from the seed region and two psychological interaction re-
gressors (risky decisions in the threat condition and the safe condition).
These regressors were created by multiplying the neural activity in the
seed region during the relevant decisions with the regressors correspond-
ing to the decision-related activity in the two contexts (condition-specific
onset and offset times convolved with the canonical HRF). PPI contrast
maps for each subject were entered into a second-level random-effects
group analysis using the same inference procedures as for the GLM anal-
yses described above.
Please note that these PPI analyses were conducted on the residuals of
the original GLM model; this ensures that any changes in functional
coupling are estimated after the average activity elicited by each decision
type has been modeled. Changes in PPI coupling therefore cannot be
confounded by changes in overall signal during both conditions. More-
over, to ensure that changes in noise/signal variability during the two
affective contexts cannot confound the PPI analyses, we also compared
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) within the VMPFC, VS, and insula dur-
ing threat and safe blocks. To this end, we extracted the filtered signal
time series from a 12mm sphere centered on our activation peaks within
the VMPFC and insula and from a 6mmpeak centered on our activation
peak in VS for the time periods corresponding to the threat and safe
blocks. We then calculated the SNR (defined as the absolute condition-
specific mean/the condition-specific SD) during safe and threat blocks,
and compared them statistically. This did not reveal any SNR differences
between safe and threat blocks in VMPFC (t(32) 0.291, p 0.773), VS
(t(32) 1.182, p 0.246), and insula (t(32) 0.475, p 0.638), even after
controlling for confounding factors, such as age and trait anxiety
(VMPFC: affective context coefficient estimate,0.008, T0.30, p
0.769; VS: affective context coefficient estimate,0.033, T1.20, p
0.236; insula: affective context coefficient estimate,0.020, T0.48,
p 0.632). This demonstrates that any change in PPI coupling between
both affective contexts is not confounded by differences in overall signal
or noise levels and therefore most likely reflects changes in functional
coupling.
Results
Threat of shock induces anticipatory anxiety
Analysis of the SCR, behavioral, and neuroimaging data con-
firmed that our threat-of-shock manipulation was indeed suc-
cessful in inducing anticipatory anxiety. First, mean SCRs during
decision trials in threat periods were increased relative to those
during safe decision trials. A two-way repeated-measures
ANOVA (withGreenhouse–Geisser correction)with factors time
(0–16 s following trial onset, averaged across 1 s bins) and affec-
tive context (threat vs safe) revealed significant main effects for
both affective context (F(1,30)  82.180, p  0.0001) and time
(F(16,30) 3.245, p 0.019), as well as a significant interaction of
affective context and time (F(1,16) 31.15, p 0.001). These SCR
increases lasted for the full trial (from 1 until 16 s after each trial
onset), as indicated by Bonferroni-corrected pairwise t tests con-
trasting SCR responses during threat and safe trials (all t(30) 
9.07, all p 0.0001). Thus, the ongoing threat of painful shocks
had a physiologically arousing impact on our participants during
the performance of the choice paradigm.
Second, SCR increases for threat contexts were also evident
during time periods when electrical stimulation was actually ad-
ministered. ANOVA (with Greenhouse–Geisser correction) of
the SCR data following stimulus administration also revealed
highly significant main effects of affective context (F(1,30) 48.2,
p 0.0001) and time (F(16,30) 15.826, p 0.0001), as well as a
significant interaction of affective context and time (F(1,16) 
16.3, p 0.0001). These SCR increases for strong relative to weak
stimulation were evident from 3 until 16 s after the onset of the
electric stimulus (all t(30)  6.94, all p  0.001). This confirms
that the strong stimulation itself—on top of the expectation of
this stimulation throughout the block—led to strong physiolog-
ical arousal in our participants (Fig. 2a).
Third, the arousing impact of the anticipatory anxiety during
threat contexts was also confirmed by the choice RT data (Fig.
2b). A regression of RTs on the independent variables affective
context (threat vs safe) and choice (LO and SO) revealed signifi-
cant effects for both affective context (t(32)3.01, p 0.005)
and choice (t(32)4.24, p 0.001), but no interaction (t(32)
0.11, p  0.91). Participants were faster to respond when
choosing LO than when choosing SO, and, importantly, also for
choices in the threat versus safe context. The latter result demon-
strates the effectiveness of our emotional manipulation on overt
behavior (Robinson et al., 2013b).
Finally, the affective efficiency of the painful electric stimula-
tion during threat contexts was also confirmed by the fMRI data.
When contrasting neural responses to the strong stimulation
during threat blocks with those to the weak stimulation in safe
blocks, we observed activation of a putative pain matrix (Tracey
and Mantyh, 2007; Leknes and Tracey, 2008), including bilateral
insula, bilateral supplementarymotor area, cerebellum, and right
anterior/mid-cingulate cortex (p 0.05, whole-brain FEW cor-
rected; Fig. 2c).
Anticipatory anxiety does not affect revealed preferences
The analysis of the choice data showed that anticipatory anxiety
did not change overt preferences, as measured with different in-
dices. First, gambling rates did not differ significantly between
threat and safe trials (t(32) 0.05, p 0.96; Fig. 3a). Subjects were
in fact highly consistent in their decisions between threat and safe
trials. When specific gambles were offered in both contexts, the
same option was chosen in 89% of cases (Fig. 3b). Second, when
preferences weremodeled via CPT, we foundmild degrees of loss
aversion that did not differ between the threat and safe contexts
(Fig. 3c), as confirmed via t test of the difference between 	S and
	T [mean (SEM); 	S 1.291 (0.05) and 	T 1.29 (0.05); (	S
	T)0.0007 (0.0085); t(32) 0.08, p 0.93]. Finally, we tested
whether the curvature for gains and losses was changed during
the threat of shocks compared with the safe contexts. We did not
observe any significant differences between both contexts for 
[T 0.933 (0.0118); S 0.934 (0.0126); t(32)0.5052, p
0.617] and  [T 1.077 (0.0144); S 1.078 (0.0134); t(32)
0.2189, p 0.8281]. Across participants, the small changes in loss
aversion and risk attitude due to affective context appeared to be
normally distributed (as confirmed by the test for normality of
Lilliefors, 1967; with 	: D 0.14, p 0.13; Fig. 3d; with : D
0.12, p 0.29; andwith:D 0.12, p 0.27). Thus, any changes
in loss aversion and risk attitude due to anticipatory anxiety
were not significantly different from zero and were normally
distributed across participants; it is therefore unlikely that
different participants reacted in a different manner to the af-
fective manipulation.
The similar choice behavior in the two affective contexts raises
the question of whether participants may have responded from
memory when each lottery was presented for the second time in a
different affective context. Suchmemory effects are generally un-
likely, as participants would have to remember their responses
across 280 trials, and as the presentation order across affective
contexts was fully balanced. Nevertheless, we explicitly tested
whether participants pondered their choices in a similar fashion
for first and second presentations of lotteries within each context,
by means of regressionmodels that included the order of presen-
tation of identical gambles (first vs second presentation), affec-
tive context (threat vs safe), the experimental trial (1–280), gain
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and loss amounts, as well as relevant two-way interaction terms.
Importantly, RTs during first versus second presentations were
not significantly different (order coefficient: 14.438, T 
0.13, p 0.895) andwere similarly affected by affective context
(Affective Context  Order coefficient: 40.4184, T  1.41, p 
0.159), possible gains (Gains  Order coefficient: 1.809, T 
0.70, p  0.481), and possible losses (Losses  Order coeffi-
cient:0.148, T0.04, p 0.966). These results suggest that
participants did not respond from memory for the second pre-
sentations of the lotteries but rather actively evaluated all lotter-
ies. This conclusion is further backed up by our finding of robust
value signals in the BOLD data (see below).
Anticipatory anxiety shifts the focus of neural valuation from
positive ESV to negative ESV coding
Even though anticipatory anxiety did not change overt behavior, it
may nevertheless have affected the way the brain valued the choice
options during decision making. Initial analysis confirmed our ex-
pectation that, when pooling across threat and safe trials, ESV cor-
relatedpositivelywith activity in theVMPFC(x2, y47, z8,
T 3.34) and the VS (subregion 1: x1 3, y1 11, z18, T
3.59; subregion 2: x25, y2 12, z25, T 3.42). However,
when directly comparing neural correlates of ESV between threat
and safe trials, we found that anticipatory anxiety led to a significant
disruption of ESV coding in bothVMPFC (x3, y 39, z5,
T3.59;Fig. 4a,c) andVS(x6,y6, z6;T3.24;Fig. 4a,d).
To characterize this interaction effect, we investigated parametric
correlations between BOLD and ESV during threat and safe trials
separately. Both the VMPFC and VS coded ESV during safe trials
(VMPFC:x3, y40, z8,T3.87;VS:x6, y6, z6,
T 4.56) but not during threat trials (no significant ESV-related
activity was found in those regions). Moreover, a conjunction
analysis of the ESV contrast images during threat and safe trials
did not reveal any activity in these regions.
Figure 2. Evidence for efficacy of the threat-of-shock paradigm in inducing anticipatory anxiety.a, SCR changes due to threat-of-shockmanipulation. The plots showmean (SEM) SCRs during
choices under threat of shock (left) and during the experience of the electrical shocks (right). Significantly increased SCRswere observed for choices during the anticipation of strong comparedwith
weak stimulation, and following strong versus weak stimulation. This demonstrates the psychological and physiological efficacy of the threat-of-shock manipulation. b, Influence of choice and
threat-of-shockmanipulation on reaction times. RTswere decreased under anticipatory anxiety and for choices of the lottery option. c, Neural correlates of strong versusweak electrical stimulation.
Strong comparedwithweak stimulation intensity led to activation of the “painmatrix,” including bilateral insula, anterior andmiddle cingulate cortices, right somatosensory cortex, and cerebellum
( p 0.05, FEW corrected). Mean (SEM) estimates extracted frommiddle cingulate cortex (x 14, y33, z 46; left) and from right insula (x 41, y1, z5) showed a signal
increaseduring strongelectrical stimulationandno signal increaseduringweak stimulation. These activationpatterns due to strongversusweakelectrical stimulationdemonstrate thephysiological
effectiveness of the threat-of-shock manipulation. **p 0.01, ***p 0.001.
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A very different pattern of results was
observed in right anterior insula, where
ESV coding also differed between both af-
fective contexts (x 39, y 0, z 0; T
3.25; Fig. 4b,e). Separate analyses of neural
signals during both contexts revealed that
ESV was not significantly correlated with
BOLD signals during safe trials (no voxel
was found), but was instead negatively
correlated with BOLD signals during
threat trials (left insula cluster 1: x30,
y 21, z 13,T 3.48; left insula cluster
2: x40, y 20, z 4, T 3.38; right
insula: x  39, y  12, z  6, T 
3.44). Again, a conjunction analysis of the
ESV contrast images during threat and
safe trials did not reveal any activity in this
area. Thus, during anticipatory anxiety,
the insula increased its activity for smaller
U(x), and therefore for larger, potentially
negative outcomes. Anticipatory anxiety
therefore led to a qualitatively distinct
style of neural value coding by disrupting
positive value coding in the VMPFC and
the VS while simultaneously enhancing
negative value coding in the anterior
insula.
Anticipatory anxiety changes trial-by-
trial relationship between neural signal
in ROIs and economic choice
The fMRI results described above identi-
fied regions in the VMPFC, VS, and insula where neural activity
correlated with different aspects of subjective values during the
two affective contexts (positive ESVs during safe trials and nega-
tive ESVs during threat trials). As a next step, we corroborated
that the change in neural coding in these regions between both
contexts is tightly linked to behavior. For this analysis, we ex-
tracted the neural activity for each trial from the ROIs in the
VMPFC, VS, and insula, and regressed the choice outcomes for
each trial on the activity in each region, the affective context, and
the interaction of both variables (see Materials and Methods).
Before this analysis, we ensured that the ROI data could replicate
the results of the SPM analysis by performing a regression of
neural activity in each region on subjective values, affective con-
text, and their interaction. Importantly, the ROIs for both anal-
yses were similarly defined using the well established leave-one-
subject-out approach (Esterman et al., 2010), which avoids
circularity and enabled us to perform this prediction analysis
with independent data (see Materials and Methods).
The independent ROI analysis clearly confirmed the results of
the SPM analysis. As illustrated in Figure 4, all regions showed a
negative change in value coding from the safe to the threat con-
text, as indicated by a significant interaction between subjective
value and threat (VMPFC: interaction coefficient  0.0071,
T  2.70, p  0.0035; VS: interaction coefficient  0.0046,
T  1.99, p  0.0231; insula: interaction coefficient 
0.0077, T  2.01, p  0.0221). Importantly, the pattern of
this interaction was different for the insula compared with the VS
and the VMPFC (Fig. 4). Whereas the signal in VMPFC and VS
tracked ESVs during the safe condition andwas suppressed under
conditions of threat (VMPFC: ESVS coefficient  0.0057, T 
2.77, p  0.0028; ESVT coefficient  0.0014, T  0.77, p 
0.2201; VS: ESVS coefficient  0.0050, T  3.95, p  0.0001;
ESVT coefficient 0.0004, T 0.25, p 0.4028), activity in the
insula did not track value during safe trials but coded negative
subjective value during the threat condition (insula: ESVS coeffi-
cient 0.0024,T 0.86, p 0.194; ESVT coefficient0.0052,
T  1.98, p  0.0239). These results from the independent
ROIs thus fully confirm the relationship between subjective val-
ues and regional signals in VMPFC, VS, and insula.
Next, we tested whether trial-by-trial signal changes within
our ROIs in the valuation network directly map onto actual eco-
nomic decisions.Wepredicted that the trial-by-trial signal within
these independent regions not only reflects subjective values, but
can also directly predict observed choices. In line with all previ-
ous results, we expected that decision outcomes in the absence of
threat should be predicted only by the VMPFC andVS signal, but
in the presence of threat only by insula activity. In line with this
prediction, we found significant interactions between neural sig-
nal and threat for VMPFC (interaction coefficient  0.246,
Wald Z  2.54, p  0.0056) and insula (interaction coeffi-
cient0.1162, Wald Z1.71, p 0.044). As illustrated in
Figure 5a, VMPFC neural signals predicted choice only during
safe trials (safe coefficient 0.1876, Wald Z 3.35, p 0.0004)
but not during threat trials (threat coefficient0.0550, Wald
Z  0.79, p  0.2161), whereas the opposite pattern was ob-
tained in the insula (safe coefficient 0.0302,WaldZ 0.69, p
0.24475; threat coefficient  0.089, Wald Z  1.84; p 
0.033). The corresponding interaction in the ventral striatumwas
weaker and nonsignificant (interaction coefficient  0.125,
Wald Z0.82, p 0.206), perhaps due to greater noise in the
signals extracted from this small region. Nevertheless, in analogy
to the VMPFC and again, consistent with our hypothesis, neural
Figure 3. Effects of the threat-of-shock manipulation on choices. a, Gambling rates (mean SEM) did not differ for the two
affective contexts. b, Histogram of participants’ consistency rates [match of responses (in percentages) for the identical choices
across the affective contexts]. Participants chose the same options on average in 89 11% of all gambles that were repeated
across contexts. c, Average SEM loss aversionparameter	 across both contexts. Both threat and safe trials led to similar degrees
of loss aversion.d, Histogramof the participants’ changes in loss aversion due to the affectivemanipulation. The changeswere not
different from zero and normally distributed [mean 	S  	T 0.0007 (SEM 0.0085)]. Thus, the analysis of different
behavioral parameters revealed the stability of choice across affective contexts.
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Figure4. Changes in the correlationof regional BOLD signalswith subjective values due to threat of shock (interaction contrast, ESVS ESVT). Such changeswereobserved ina [VMPFC (x3,
y 39, z5), and VS (x 6, y 6, z6)] as well as b insula (x 39, y 0, z 0). Voxels in blue show positive correlation with subjective value during safe trials, voxels in red show
negative correlations with SV during threat trials, and voxels in yellow show a significant interaction. c– e, ROI analyses confirm the pattern of interactions found in the SPM analyses. To avoid
circularity, a LOSO approachwas used to extractweights from independent ROIs (see text for details). The plots show the average trial-by-trial relationship (lines SEMas shaded area) between
regional activity and subjective value, as estimated in regression analyses of these betas (see main text). For both VMPFC (c) and VS (d), positive correlations between subjective value and BOLD
activity were present in safe trials, but were significantly weaker (and, in fact, absent) during threat trials. e, In contrast, the insula showed no correlation with subjective value coding during safe
trials, but significantly stronger negative value coding (increasing activity for decreasing expected subjective value) during threat trials. These findings suggest that anticipatory anxiety caused a
distinct style of neural value coding by disrupting positive value coding in the VMPFC and the VS, and simultaneously enhancing negative value coding in the anterior insula. All imaging results are
displayed at p 0.005 for display purposes. The shaded error bars reflect robust and clustered SEM.
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signals in the VS predicted choices during safe trials (safe coeffi-
cient 0.2189,WaldZ 2.60, p 0.0047) but not during threat
trials (threat coefficient  0.0909, Wald Z  0.95, p  0.17095;
Fig. 5a). Together, these regression analyses therefore establish
that the different patterns of neural ESV coding in the two affec-
tive contexts are both clearly linked to choice behavior. More-
over, all our results on neural valuation signals show that
participants did compute subjective values for all choices, even
though these computations were implemented in different corti-
cal areas, depending on affective context. The presence of these
context-dependent value computations makes it very unlikely
that participants responded from memory on the 50% of trials
where gambles were presented a second time.
Negative baseline shifts in VMPFC during anticipatory
anxiety
What mechanism may underlie the breakdown of positive value
coding under anticipatory anxiety? One possibility is that in the
threat context, the processing of lottery values in the VS and
VMPFC may interact with the negative emotional value associ-
ated with the anticipated uncomfortable stimulation (Talmi et
al., 2009;Winecoff et al., 2013). Given the salience of anticipatory
anxiety relative to lottery outcomes, the processing of the aversive
emotional event can be expected to overshadow value coding
with respect to probabilistic financial gains. If this were the case,
then BOLD signals in the VS and VMPFC should be lower on
average for threat compared with safe trials, pooled across all
possible financial outcomes. We tested this conjecture by con-
trasting task-related activity in threat versus safe trials, indepen-
dent of correlations with trial-wise ESV. Consistent with our
conjecture, threat trials were associated with decreased task-
related activations in VMPFC (x8, y 35, z2;T 5.58;
Fig. 5b), amygdala (x 29, y 3, z29; T 4.56), and insula
(x 45, y 0, z 1; T 3.64, x45, y3, z2; T
4.45). These observations confirm that anticipatory anxiety due
to the impending strong stimulation can decrease the overall ac-
tivation of valuation brain regions (Talmi et al., 2009). This may
reduce the excitability of these brain regions for coding the pos-
itive values of probabilistic financial gains, as suggested by the
observed breakdown of positive ESV coding in the threatening
context.
Anticipatory anxiety decreases functional connectivity in the
valuation network
If anticipatory anxiety disrupts the neural processing of possible
financial outcomes during choice, then this may not only affect
activity in single brain areas but also functional communication
within the connected network of value-related brain areas. Thus,
we hypothesized that the VMPFC may show reduced functional
connectivity with other value-related brain regions during antic-
ipatory anxiety.We formally tested this conjecture with PPI anal-
yses of context-dependent changes in functional connectivity of
the VMPFC (seeded at x3, y 39, z5, Fig. 6a) between
threat and safe contexts. This revealed that threat contexts indeed
lead to significantly decreased functional coupling of the VMPFC
with the following two other key value-related brain areas: the
VS (x  6, y  14, z  11, T  3.64; Fig. 6b,c); and the
insula (x  38, y  17, z  8, T  4.9; Fig. 6b,d). This
confirms that anticipatory anxiety disrupted positive ESV
coding both at the level of local activity within areas of the
value network, but also at the level of functional integration
between these brain regions.
We also tested the hypothesis that anticipatory anxiety may
change functional communication between valuation areas and
regions outside the classic valuation system, which may possibly
be involved in action selection regardless of affective context. For
this purpose, we conducted PPI analyses based on seed regions in
the VS (at x 6, y 6, z6), the insula (at x 39, y 0, z
0), and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; seeded at the
DLPFC peak voxel in the neurosynth automated meta-analysis
for the term cognitive control: x 50, y 36, z 24). However,
we did not find any reduction in functional connectivity between
our areas of interest and other regions outside the classic valua-
tion system. The unchanged functional involvement of cognitive
control areas such as theDLPFCmayperhaps reflect that neurons
in the VMPFC and insula not only compute values, but also
encode signals used for flexible choice and action selection
(Paulus et al., 2005; Hunt et al., 2014; Strait et al., 2014). In any
case, our results confirm that anticipatory anxiety during the
threatening context disrupted positive ESV coding both at the
level of local activity within areas of the value network, but also at
the level of functional integration between these brain regions.
Figure 5. a, Results from logistic regressions predicting choice based on regional activity in VMPFC, VS, and insula. Both VMPFC and VS predict choice only during safe trials, but not during threat
trials. In contrast, the insula shows the opposite pattern of predicting choice (negatively) only during threat trials, but not during safe trials. b, Decreases in average VMPFC BOLD signals during
choices due to threat of shock (TS TT). Anticipation of strong electrical stimulation led to general BOLD signal reduction in VMPFC (x8, y 35, z2) pooled across all ESV levels.
Anticipatory anxiety led to decreases in overall activity for valuation brain regions during choice, possibly due to the inherent negative value of the impending strong stimulation. The bar plot shows
mean regression coefficients extracted from a 12 mm sphere around the VMPFC activation peak to illustrate the pattern of suppressed activity during choices in the threat versus safe context. The
imaging results are displayed at p 0.005 for display purposes. Error bars reflect SEM.
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Discussion
This study investigated how incidental anxiety can affect
value-based decisions under risk. Purely behavioral effects of
background emotions on choice are well documented in the
clinical and psychology literature (Maner et al., 2007; Clark et
al., 2012; Giorgetta et al., 2012; Grecucci et al., 2013) but have
been less prominently investigated from the perspective of
underlying neural activity (Pessoa and Pereira, 2013). Here we
investigated this issue with an experimental threat-of-shock
paradigm that allowed us to induce anticipatory anxiety in
healthy participants while they took risky choices during
fMRI. We find that this affective manipulation did not change
overt choices, but fundamentally altered value coding in the
brain. In the safe context, the expected subjective values of the
gambles were coded positively in the VMPFC and VS. During
the threat context, these processes collapsed and were replaced
by negative value coding in the anterior insula (i.e., increased
activity for increasingly worse outcomes). In general, our re-
sults are congruent with previous findings (Kim et al., 2011)
that the VS and VMPFC can code subjective value in a positive
manner, whereas the insula can show negative correlations
with subjective values. However, our data show that these two
types of value representations can be dissociated and may de-
pend flexibly on the affective state, with a dominance of pos-
Figure6. Changes in functional connectivitywithin the valuationnetworkduring anticipatory anxiety.a– c, Threat of shock led todecreased connectivity between the seed region inVMPFC (x
3, y 39, y5; a) and both VS (x6, y 14, z11, T 3.64; b, c) and insula (x38, y 17, z8, T 4.9; b, d). Thus, anticipatory anxiety disrupted the functional
integration of the valuation network of the brain. Error bars reflect SEM. All results are displayed at p 0.005 for display purposes. Error bars reflect the SEM.
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itive value coding in the VMPFC and VS during neutral states,
and a prevalence of negative value coding in the insula during
negative affective states. This dependence of value coding on
affective context may not have been evident in previous neu-
roimaging studies that measured value-related brain activity
in just one affective context (usually neutral; for review, see
Levy and Glimcher, 2011, 2012; Bartra et al., 2013). However,
please note that both the diminished value sensitivity in
VMPFC and its decreased communication with the striatum
under anticipatory anxiety are clearly consistent with rodent
studies that have demonstrated impaired value coding and
reward learning under stress (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009).
Strikingly, the shift in value coding between affective contexts
was not accompanied by changes in revealed economic prefer-
ences, as measured by overt choice (only reaction times were
affected). Nevertheless, our analyses revealed a tight link between
neural value signals and behavior in both affective contexts, with
neural activity in VMPFC and VS predicting choices only for safe
trials, and neural activity in the insula predicting choices only for
threat trials. Our results thus demonstrate that the same behav-
ioral outcome can be realized through different neural value-
coding mechanisms. This finding is generally congruent with
multiple-systems theories of decision making stating that dif-
ferent valuation systems can guide choice, depending on the
properties of the decision-making situation (Rangel et al.,
2008). That neural valuation processes can change during neg-
ative affective states is corroborated by findings (Schwabe et
al., 2012) that hormonally induced stress can lead to a change
from goal-directed to habitual decision control and reduced
value sensitivity in medial prefrontal cortex. Our findings
therefore suggest that during anxiety the same behavioral
choices may have been brought about by goal-directed nega-
tive value computations in the insula (rather than positive
value computations in the VMPC and VS), possibly in con-
junction with compensatory mechanisms such as heuristics
and increased habitual responding. In either case, we speculate
that the reduction of value coding in the VMPFC and VS
during anxiety may indicate a decrease in the positive value of
the available choice options, even though such speculations
need to be taken with caution given the problem of reverse
inference in neuroimaging studies (Poldrack, 2011).
The conjecture that anticipatory anxiety may have decreased
neural sensitivity for the subjective value of the choice-relevant
stimuli is congruent with our findings of (1) a general negative
baseline shift in VMPFC during threat and (2) reduced func-
tional connectivity of this area with the insula and the VS. This
assumption dovetails with the results of previous neuroimaging
studies on the integration of emotional and economic value
(Talmi et al., 2009; Park et al., 2011; Winecoff et al., 2013). Spe-
cifically, recent findings suggest that VMPFC signals track the
emotional value of stimuli on the one hand (Winecoff et al.,
2013) and economic value on the other (Levy and Glimcher,
2012). Moreover, Talmi et al. (2009) found decreased value sig-
nals in VMPFC for choices comprising a task-contingent painful
stimulus. Here we show that even a fully incidental but highly
salient and emotionally aversive event—the anticipation of pain-
ful electrical stimulation—can overshadow neural signals related
to economic value computations. This supports the notion that
emotional and economic value may be processed by the same
VMPFC region, extending the hypothesis that the VMPFC en-
codes a standardized economic value signal to the domain of
emotional value (Montague and Berns, 2002; Rangel and Hare,
2010). Moreover, our findings are consistent with suggestions
that the VMPFC may compute subjective values even for certain
task-irrelevant stimuli (Lebreton et al., 2009; Levy et al., 2011;
Ku¨hn and Gallinat, 2012) and that negative affective states (i.e.,
anxiety or stress) can lead to structural and functional changes in
the VMPFC (Liston et al., 2006; McEwen, 2007).
However, it could be argued that the diminished VMPFC ac-
tivity under anticipatory anxiety may not reflect changes in neu-
ral value processing but rather reduced default mode network
(DMN) activity, as DMN activity is commonly observed in the
VMPFC. However, this alternative explanation appears very un-
likely. Inhibitions of DMNactivity would be expressed in a whole
network of regions comprising the VMPFC, posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC), and temporoparietal junction (TPJ; Buckner et al.,
2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Li et al., 2014), would be ac-
companied by a concomitant increase in frontoparietal activity
(Fox et al., 2005; Sridharan et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2013), and
would be more marked in conditions with higher cognitive de-
mand and thus longer reaction times (McKiernan et al., 2003). In
our task, a negative baseline shiftwas foundonly in theVMPFC(but
not in the PCC and TPJ) in the threat context that actually led to
faster RTs (rather than increased demand indicated by slowed re-
sponses).The reductions inVMPFCsignals foundhere are therefore
more likely to indicate reduced positive value coding due to the high
negative value of the impending painful stimulation.
Our results show that the functional changes due to the threat
of shock not only affected the VMPFC in isolation but also its
functional connectivity with other areas. This suggests weakened
function of an entire valuation network (rather than single re-
gions) under anticipatory anxiety. Viewed from this network per-
spective, the reduction in connectivity between VMPFC and
insula may indicate a release from inhibition in the insula that
may have resulted in stronger negative value coding during threat
trials. Importantly, the insula showed two distinct types of signals
in our study. One of these signals appeared related to valuation
during threat trials, and consisted of a negative baseline shift and
enhanced negative value coding (Sescousse et al., 2013; Tanaka et
al., 2014). The other signal was elicited by the painful shocks
when these were actually administered, reminiscent of the well
reported activity in the so-called pain matrix (Tracey and Man-
tyh, 2007; Leknes and Tracey, 2008). We speculate that these two
effects may reflect the involvement of separate neural popula-
tions, for two reasons. First, it is well established that the insula
contains functionally diverse types of neurons (Chang et al.,
2013; Uddin et al., 2014) that are nevertheless spatially intermin-
gled. This may explain why in our data, the activation peaks for
both types of signals were spatially separated (5 mm apart). Sec-
ond, pain-processing neurons in the insula usually show positive
baseline shifts during the anticipation and actual delivery of (pre-
dictable) painful shocks (Jones et al., 1992; Apkarian et al., 2005;
Dalton et al., 2005; Carlsson et al., 2006; Choi et al., 2012). The
negative baseline shifts found here during the threat blocks (with
unpredictable stimulation) are thus more likely to reflect valua-
tion processes, which is in line with findings that insula activity
reflects value computations in other contexts (Sescousse et al.,
2013; Tanaka et al., 2014) and is susceptible to stress during de-
cision making (Lighthall et al., 2009, 2012).
Our study may have important implications for neurobiolog-
ical perspectives on maladaptive anxiety and related psychopa-
thology. Transient anxiety states normally carry adaptive value
since they may increase vigilance and attention to possible nega-
tive outcomes that should be avoided. This functional anxiety,
however, may turn into amaladaptive state if anxious behavior is
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permanently adopted and becomes detached from the environ-
ment (Grupe and Nitschke, 2013).We find that transient anxiety
leads to a change in neural value coding in the absence of changes
in overt behavior. This situation may resemble prodromal stages
of anxiety disorders where no pathological decision making is
evident, as the anxious persons might use compensatory strate-
gies (e.g., increased focus on task or calculation) to overcome the
pathological risk aversion typical for anxiety disorders (Maner et
al., 2007; Giorgetta et al., 2012). Our findings suggest that during
such early stages, a neural focus on negative value might not be
accompanied by striking behavioral changes. However, the per-
manent adoption of these strategies might lead to gradual deteri-
oration of the neural valuation system and/or compensatory
strategies until behavioral deviations emerge. Similar mecha-
nisms may be at play in depression, where early stages of the
illness are associated with decreased hedonic capacity (indicated
by changes in neural value processing) without observable aber-
rant decision making, whereas later stages are also often associ-
ated with altered value-based decision making (Treadway and
Zald, 2011; Der-Avakian and Markou, 2012). This may be con-
sistent with the assumption that a persistent focus on negative
value coding due to the ongoing incidental negative affect may
ultimately lead to a functional deterioration of the valuation sys-
temof the brain and therefore to changes of overt behavior. Thus,
our findings suggest a pathway for the transition from adaptive to
maladaptive emotional responses, as is commonly observed in
anxiety and affective disorders (Paulus and Yu, 2012).
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